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## THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT AND DIASPORA-ARMENIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR

### Annotation

*The Second Karabakh War not only resulted in the re-joining of Karabakh to Azerbaijan, but also changed Armenia's foreign policy to an important extent. On the other hand, it revealed the true potential of its popular diaspora. After the war, the diaspora and Armenia are experiencing serious problems in determining the direction of foreign policy. The conflicts that have arisen in relations with Russia have significantly disrupted relations with the diaspora here. Instead, reformist members of the diaspora in France and the United States are strengthening their influence on the Armenian authorities. On the other hand, Armenia's claims of normalization of relations with its neighbors worsened the attitude of radical and traditional diaspora organizations towards the government. Thus, although the Pashinyan administration's relations with individual modernist diaspora groups have increased, the relations with traditional and fundamental diaspora bodies have reached the level of hostility. In particular, the 2022 rallies revealed the broad cooperation of the radical diaspora with the opposition, led by the Dashnaks. But in any case, this fear prompted Armenia's indecisive participation in the peace process. The direction of Armenia in the future will be influenced by the internal balance of diaspora forces.*

**Keywords:** diaspora, foreign policy, Armenian government, Karabakh war, contradiction, priority.

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## ERMƏNİSTAN HÖKUMƏTİNİN XARİCİ SİYASƏT KURSU VƏ İKİNCİ QARABAĞ MÜHARİBƏSİNDƏN SONRA DİASPORA-ERMƏNİSTAN MÜNASİBƏTLƏRİ

### Annотasiya

*İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsi təkcə Qarabağın yenidən Azərbaycanın tərkibinə qatılması ilə nəticələnmədi, eləcə də, Ermənistan xarici siyasətini önəmli ölçüdə dəyişdi. Digər yandan onun məşhur diasporasının əsl potensialı ortaya çıxardı. Müharibədən sonra diaspora və Ermənistan xarici siyasət istiqamətlərini müəyyənləşdirməklə bağlı ciddi problemlər yaşayır. Rusiya ilə münasibətlərdə ortaya çıxan ziddiyyətlər buradakı diaspora ilə münasibətləri də əhəmiyyətli şəkildə pozmuşdur. Əvəzində isə Fransa və ABŞ-dəki yenilikçi diaspora üzvləri Ermənistan hakimiyyəti üzərində təsirlərini daha da möhkəmləndirməkdədir. Digər bir tərəfdən Ermənistanın qonşuları ilə münasibətləri normallaşdırma iddiaları radikal və ənənəvi diaspora təşkilatlarının hakimiyyətə olan münasibətini daha da pisləşdirmişdir. Beləliklə, Paşinyan administrasiyasının ayrı-ayrı modernist diaspora qrupları ilə əlaqələri artsa da, ənənəvi və köklü diaspora orqanları ilə münasibətlər düşmənçilik həddinə çatmışdır. Xüsusən 2022-ci il mitingləri hökumət daşnaklar başda olmaqla radikal diasporanın müxalifətlə geniş əlbirliyini ortaya qoydu. Lakin istənilən halda bu qorxu Ermənistanın sülh prosesində qətiyyətsiz iştirakına rəvac verdi. Gələcəkdə Ermənistanın hansı istiqamətə doğru yönələcəyinə diaspora daxili qüvvələr balansının da təsiri olacaqdır.*

*Açar sözlər: diaspora, xarici siyasət, Ermənistan hökuməti, Qarabağ müharibəsi, ziddiyət, prioritet.*

### **Introduction**

In 2020, the conflict situation in Nagorno-Karabakh aggravated. This was prompted by provocations committed by the Armenian side. Thus, on July 12, the Armenian army, which was trying to attack from the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan, was successfully prevented by the Azerbaijani army. The location of Tovuz outside the conflict zone indicated that Armenia was clearly trying to expand the scale of the conflict. Finally, on September 27, after another Armenian provocation, the Azerbaijani army counterattacked. As a result, rising tensions led to a new war, called the Second Karabakh War, which lasted 44 days. Throughout the war, the Azerbaijani army continued to advance and liberate its lands one by one. The Armenian side, which lost one lands after another, suffered serious soldiers and material losses, was forced to sign a statement with Azerbaijan on November 10 with the mediation of Russia. As a result, Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity.

It was the Second Karabakh War and a series of subsequent processes that led to serious changes in the balance of political and military forces in the region, in Armenia's foreign policy, as well as in the relations between the Armenian authorities and the Armenian diaspora.

Taking into account that Armenia's foreign policy directions are largely shaped by the diaspora at the present time, I think it is necessary to examine the Second Karabakh War, which was a turning point in Armenia-Diaspora relations, and the processes that followed it, and the attitude of the Armenian diaspora to these processes.

### ***The efficiency of the Diaspora during the Second Karabakh war***

The Armenian diaspora became somewhat active during the war. Part of the Diaspora's activities was to provide Armenia with economic and financial assistance, as well as military equipment and to encourage other countries to provide such assistance. In total, only \$150 million was donated to Armenia during the war. This is a very small number for the Armenians of the world, who have a population of about 10 million. In addition, this amount includes funds transferred by dozens of billionaire and millionaire Armenian oligarchs. 45% of this amount was transferred by Armenians living in the United States. The Armenian diaspora in Russia was very passive in the aid process (slightly more than 10%) [1]. This difference is understandable, given that the United States has a higher rate middle-class Armenian population and more organized than Russia. But in any case, the assistance provided to Armenia by the Armenian diaspora is not proportional to its prestige and power.

In addition, the Diaspora was skeptical about how the government would spend the money raised. It is no secret that the level of corruption in Armenia is high. In this case, it is difficult to believe how donations will be spent correctly and transparently. The incoming aid was mostly transferred to the All Armenia Fund. This fund is notorious for money laundering and embezzlement [2].

The Diaspora helped to send Armenian volunteers abroad, as well as mercenaries of other nationalities, to the Karabakh zone. Since the beginning of the war, Azerbaijani and Turkish officials have claimed that mercenary militants from Syria were involved in the war from Armenian side. Many of them were former members of ASALA or other terrorist forces involved in the Syrian civil war [3].

From France, Russia, Greece, Lebanon, Syria, Latin American countries and others, a large number of Armenian volunteers were involved in the war through the Diaspora. Another part of the Diaspora's activities during the Second Karabakh War was the imposition of sanctions on

Azerbaijan by other states, the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomy and, at least in this way, intervention of foreign countries in the conflict. After the signing of the tripartite statement, a number of biased recommendations were adopted in the Parliaments of France, Holland and Belgium with the pressure of the Armenian lobby and the close participation of pro-Armenian deputies. In these resolutions, it is alleged that the life of the Armenian population in Karabakh is in danger and therefore international intervention is required, as well as Azerbaijan and even Türkiye are described as aggressor countries and sanctions against them were proposed [4]. Especially France has been one of Armenia's closest supporters during and after the Second Karabakh War. During the war, the French government repeatedly sent "humanitarian aid" to Armenia.

Apparently, despite all the activities of the Armenian diaspora during the 44-day war, no state took any official action for Armenia, nor it was likely to do so. Because Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan and it has been accepted by the whole world community.

### *Diaspora's stance on the tripartite statement of 10 November, 2020*

The stance of the Armenian diaspora towards the tripartite statement of November 10 and the current government showed disunity. The only opposition to the statement from the beginning was made by the ARF, or Dashnaksutyun, the most influential and radical organization of the Armenian diaspora. Several diaspora organizations started protesting against the Armenian government and statement only after the wave of protests in Armenia. Following the statement, the ARF and about 50 other diaspora organizations called on Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign immediately and suspend the implementation of the statement [5]. The Union of Russian Armenians also joined this call. Armenians living abroad held rallies in support of the protests in Armenia. Protests in Armenia intensified on the eve of the January 11 meeting of Ilham Aliyev, Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow. Chairman of the Union of Armenians of Russia Ara Abramyanyan wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of Armenia, demanding that he not come to the meeting in Moscow and resign immediately because he signed a statement that is not in the interests of the Armenian people. On January 11, Russian Armenians protested in front of the Armenian embassy in Russia, demanding the resignation of "traitor" Nikol Pashinyan and the complete suspension of the statement. The Dashnaks also participated widely in the protests in Russia. However, it should be noted that Abramyanyan's protests stemmed not only from national feelings but also from political goals. Thus, Abramyanyan, who participated in the 2021 extraordinary parliamentary elections in Armenia, was trying to gain support with such a political campaign. But in the end, he managed to collect only 0.95% of votes in the coalition with Tigran Urikhanyan [6]. Despite mass protests, Nikol Pashinyan managed to win the 2021 elections due to the lack of a more suitable candidate.

From April 2022, a new wave of anti-government rallies, called the "resistance movement", organized by the opposition (led by former President, pro-Russian Robert Kocharyan and former Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan) and nationalist diaspora organizations began in Armenia. The protesters oppose the normalization of relations between Pashinyan's government and Azerbaijan and Türkiye. They demanded Pashinyan's resignation because he betrayed Armenian national interests. ARF, CCAF, Union of Armenians of Russia backed these protests and organized protests in USA, Russia, France, etc. organized large solidarity demonstrations. High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs Zareh Sinanyan called Dashnak leaders' harsh attitude towards Pashinyan's government as treason, fueled the ARF-Armenian government conflict. Sinanyan faced stiff resistance from the ARF during his visit to Los Angeles [7].

Due to the protests of the Dashnaks in Russia, the prime minister had to postpone his meeting with some representatives of the diaspora during his visit to Moscow. In addition, the fact

that Pashinyan's government barred some influential members of the diaspora from entering the country by declaring them persona non grata shows that the Armenian authorities are not looking for compromise at all [8]; [9].

However, despite this, some diaspora organizations lined up with the government. The Social Democrat Hunchakian Party criticized the opposition and the diaspora groups regarding the protests in its statement, and emphasized that it is wrong for the diaspora groups to participate in such political intrigues. Hunchakian Party pointed out that the organization as well as the majority of the Armenian population do not support these protests [10]. So, in the summer of 2022, the opposition had to stop the rallies due to the limitation of its social base.

### ***The impact of the 2020 war on subsequent Armenia-diaspora relations***

Let's talk about how the 44-day war affected the Armenia-Diaspora relations, as well as solidarity within the diaspora. First of all, it should be noted that the Armenian-Diaspora relations are developing on the basis of the interests of a group of oligarchs and the Armenian political elite. The war also showed that these rich people have no intention to share the problems of the Armenian population. Their main interests are the business interests they have in Armenia or under the Armenian name. Most of the assistance was provided for this purpose.

True face of the "Diaspora-Armenia unity" was revealed during the Second Karabakh War. The main burden of the war fell on the Armenians living in Karabakh, and partly on the Armenians in Armenia. For the diaspora Armenians living thousands of kilometers away from the war, it was impossible to understand the horrors of war. The Diaspora is not interested in the welfare of Armenians living in Armenia, but in their economic and business interests.

The war also played a role in deepening the problems that dissatisfied Armenia with the Diaspora. During the entire activity of the Armenian diaspora during and after the war, no state has openly adopted a statement in support of Armenia. Several adopted documents were of advisory. Therefore, Armenia is already convinced that the Diaspora does not have as much influence as they think. Thus, the 44-day war also contributed to the testing of the strength and real potential of the Diaspora.

It also became clear after the 44-day war that solidarity within the diaspora was not so strong. The attitude of the Armenian diaspora to the Armenian government is divided into two completely different directions. It is true that on the one hand, most diaspora groups support the anti-governmental protests in Armenia and demand the resignation of the Prime Minister and the Government. According to them, the reason for the current political and economic crisis in Armenia is Nikol Pashinyan and his populist foreign policy. But on the other hand, there are some forces that support the government. They think that the reason for the difficult situation in Armenia was set by the persons in power before Nikol Pashinyan. It is the conflict founded and continued by them that has always prevented Armenia from pursuing an active foreign policy.

### ***Pashinyan's Western-leaning foreign policy and diaspora factor***

Three main trends can be observed in the course of Armenia's foreign policy after the Second Karabakh War. Firstly, the stagnation and some contradictions in the relations with Russia, in turn, the developing relations with the Western countries (primarily France); secondly, after the defeat in 2020, due to the return of Karabakh to the control of Azerbaijan, Armenia lost its rights related to negotiations on this issue and therefore narrowed his claims from the Karabakh region to the Armenians living in Karabakh; and finally the hopes of rapprochement emerging in relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan.

The pro-Russian foreign policy of the Armenian authorities before the war was replaced after the war by a relatively balanced discourse that was even capable of criticizing Russia at times.

There are two main reasons for this rhetoric. The first is that after Armenia's crushing defeat in the Second Karabakh War, Russia's alleged guarantor role in the security of Armenia and the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has been questioned by Armenian officials and political scientists. The second is that Russia's full-scale invasion against Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has a serious negative impact on its soft power and partially keeps it out of regional affairs and cripples its mediator stance. The second factor encouraged Armenia to act more freely.

Despite this, it cannot be said that the Armenian people support Pashinyan's cooling of relations with Russia. In addition to the deep economic and military-political dependence on Russia, many crucial factors can be mentioned at the root of the continued sympathy towards Russia. This is a very large Armenian diaspora living in Russia (about 2.5 million). Moreover, a large part of this diaspora are those who immigrated from Armenia after independence and a part during the USSR (unlike the diaspora in the USA, France, etc.). Therefore, most of them still have relations with Armenia. Many of them have family members living in Armenia. Russia, on the other hand, can skillfully use the migrant and non-resident population as a means of influencing the country it belongs to [11]. For this reason, a significant part of the Armenian population still supports the continuation of the alliance with Russia. The pro-European policy is in the interest of most Western Diaspora organizations. Especially strong diaspora bodies in France are one of the important forces shaping Pashinyan's Western-leaning foreign policy. As a result, these reformist diasporas are cementing their influence on Armenia in the name of democratization and European integration. But because of Russia's overarching importance, the Pashinyan administration can't go too far in its anti-Russian rhetoric, and it feels more like resentment rather than criticism. On the other hand, Diaspora groups both in the West and in the post-Soviet space understand well that, despite everything, Russia's multi-faceted influence on Armenia is still very large, and it is not an easy matter to change it. Armenia, which is already almost 100% dependent on Russia for grain and 50% for gas, is feeling the side effects of the sanctions imposed on Russia [12]. Therefore, this issue is not as controversial as the other two foreign policy issues.

### *Diaspora attitude regarding the current state of Azerbaijan-Armenia relations*

One of the obvious changes in the foreign policy strategy of the Armenian government in recent times is its approach to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. After gaining independence, the Karabakh problem had been the most important political priority of Armenia. Although this has not changed, goals and expectations have undergone serious changes after the defeat in the Second Karabakh War. This can be easily understood from Pashinyan's rhetoric as the transition from unrealistic expressions such as "Karabakh is Armenia" or "ми переможемо (we will win)" in 2019 [13], to admissions such as "The international community recognizes Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan" or "We have not taken any rational step by ignoring the resolutions of the UN Security Council on Karabakh"[14].

Today, although Armenia admits its defeat, provocative actions still continue in Karabakh. Although the Pashinyan administration has no right to make any claims regarding Karabakh, Azerbaijan still tolerates the activities of illegal Armenian gangs in Karabakh for the sake of peace. But Pashinyan understands that this is temporary. Approaching the peace talks with the hope of achieving something, Armenia is trying to act as sovereignly as possible around the Karabakh issue. Even the puppet leaders of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh republic are seriously requested to be careful in their statements and not to indulge in havoc [15].

Armenian lobby groups and diaspora organizations in France are actively working to influence the formation of biased policies of the current Macron government. But, of course, France playing a mediating role in this way is unacceptable for Azerbaijan. For this reason, after the 2022 Prague summit, President Ilham Aliyev declared that Azerbaijan will not participate in

the settlement of the conflict with the role of France as a mediator [16]. Therefore, France has to be content with only making scandalous statements that perpetuate the conflict. Due to the weakening of Russia's influence in the region (due to the war) and the unilateral position of France, the initiatives of the United States in mediation are gaining strength.

It is clear that neither the diaspora nor countries like France can help Armenia in the Karabakh issue if they do not intend to promote peace. Diaspora's mechanisms of direct influence on the Karabakh issue are limited. Although the Pashinyan government tries to suppress the voices of the Diaspora regarding Armenia's approach to the Karabakh issue, it believes that the Diaspora can and is being used in some issues in relations with Azerbaijan. For example, the Zangezur corridor, which is planned to be established between the South-West of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Armenia is trying to delay the opening of the corridor envisaged in the tripartite agreement of 10 November, and perhaps to obtain a compromise from Azerbaijan. Therefore, trying to divert attention, the action carried out by Azerbaijani ecoactivists on the Shusha section of the Khankendi-Lachin road, which began on December 12, 2022, is portrayed as a blockade. Diaspora is also managing to spread this lie of Armenia to the world. However, it is clear that the passage is being used for humanitarian purposes, and there is no question of violating the life security of the Armenian population living in Eastern Zangezur. Disinformation is spread by Armenia just to take a certain position in the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan.

As for the stance of the diaspora, Armenia does not accept the accusations of the diaspora regarding the loss of Karabakh to Armenia and the peace process with Azerbaijan. In particular, the Dashnaksutyun is the most prominent diaspora organization in anti-government discourses. Dashnaks are also represented in the Armenian parliament. They also actively participated in the 2022 "Resistance Movement" rallies inside Armenia, as well as organized such protest marches in France and the United States, as well as in Russia [6]. The authorities call the ARF traitor for violating Armenian unity, and ARF accuses of government for betraying national interests [13]. For this reason, the relations between the ARF and the Armenian authorities can be considered extremely tense. Pashinyan seems to be the most unacceptable leader for ARF. However, it seems that Pashinyan still remains in power because there is no candidate more suitable for the people than Pashinyan. Although the radical diaspora wing protested Pashinyan's policy regarding Karabakh, this actually stems from his attempts to normalize relations with his neighbors - Türkiye and Azerbaijan, rather than the loss of Karabakh. On the other hand, the protests against Pashinyan are not stronger than during the time of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Because currently there are diaspora groups who think that Pashinyan's rule is the most democratic development path possible for Armenia. Thus, although Pashinyan is in conflict with the radical diaspora regarding the loss of Karabakh and the peace process, on the other hand, he is gaining the support of many independent diaspora members in the West with his reform-oriented policy.

### ***Effects of diaspora on current peacemaking process with Türkiye***

A third change in foreign policy priorities is the hopes for the normalization of relations with Türkiye. This issue is one of the important issues of regional relations in the period after the Second Karabakh War. Although the parties met several times after appointing a special representative for the normalization of relations in December 2021, diplomatic relations have not yet been established. The thaw in bilateral relations is not carried out without obstacles, and it is questionable whether it will be successful. First of all, it should be said that Türkiye has always put forward the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the signing of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a prerequisite for opening the borders with Armenia and establishing diplomatic relations. Today, although some success has been achieved in resolving

the conflict, the peace agreement has not yet been signed with Azerbaijan. For this reason, in my opinion, the full normalization of relations between Armenia and Türkiye will wait until peace is established in the South Caucasus. The Armenian government hopes that if the opposition wins the general elections of Türkiye, which held on May 14, the precondition for the normalization of relations between Türkiye may be removed [17]. But this is a far from reality ridiculous issue.

Another issue that will seriously affect the normalization of relations with Türkiye is the will of the Armenian diaspora. First of all, it should be noted that even within Armenia, rapprochement with Türkiye is not welcomed so much. So, according to the public opinion survey conducted in Armenia in 2022, 59% of the respondents have a negative attitude towards the normalization of relations with Türkiye, and only 34% think that the opening of Armenia's borders with Türkiye is necessary for the economy [18]. Of course, the anti-Turkish propaganda carried out for many years with the influence of diaspora groups made these results inevitable.

The diaspora's position on this matter is sharper. This does not cause dissatisfaction for ordinary people of Armenian origin living outside the country. However, those who have an influence on Armenia are large diaspora groups and organizations, whose position on the issue is the same as before. Traditional diaspora groups are against the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye as before. In particular, diaspora groups in the Middle East, France, and the United States, led by the ARF, have been hostile to the normalization process since its inception. Since the Dashnaks have influence over almost all diaspora organizations, the position of the diaspora in general is not so different from that of the ARF. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also noted that these actions of the diaspora undermine the negotiation process. According to the President of Türkiye, only the Armenian government can prevent the diaspora from these actions [19].

So, in some respects, the Diaspora poses more obstacles to Armenia's foreign policy than benefits. The example of Turkish-Armenian relations is one of the relevant issues that show that the Armenian diaspora has a negative impact on Armenia's foreign policy. Although Sargsyan seemed to have achieved this in 2009, dissatisfied members of the diaspora, including the ARF, would continue to hinder the development of relations. The ideological struggle against Türkiye, the recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide, is a very important element of the existence and unity of the diaspora. However, it is clear that if relations with Türkiye normalize, it could have very serious benefits for Armenia. As a result, Armenia will have access to better transport corridors, as well as a shorter route in relations with European countries, which will further diversify exports of Armenia, and Turkish products will significantly reduce dependence on Russia in the domestic market. Thus, with the opening of borders with Türkiye, it would be very easy to resolve some issues that Diaspora cannot resolve, but the bias of the Diaspora will always be one of the obstacles to building relations with Türkiye (unless the Diaspora understands the futility of continuing this position).

### ***Conclusion***

Thus, the Armenian authorities misinformed the people during the entire war and then signed the Trilateral Statement of 10 November 2023, that ended the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, caused deep dissatisfaction of the Diaspora. Armenia's peace process with Türkiye and Azerbaijan took accusations to the next stage especially for traditional and radical diaspora organizations which point to historical hostility.

Although the Armenian regime, which takes advantage of Russia's involvement in Ukraine in foreign policy, tries to pursue a Western-oriented foreign policy as much as possible, it seems that recently it has come to the conclusion that such a foreign policy course can do more harm than good. For this reason, Pashinyan government is again trying to show loyalty to his traditional

Armenian foreign policy. For example, at the press conference held on March 14, Pashinyan apparently retracted his views from the first briefing and declared that there is no serious tension between Armenia and Russia and that Armenia will remain in the CSTO [20].

Due to the weakening of Russia's influence in the region (due to the war) and the unilateral position of France, the initiatives of the United States in mediation are gaining strength. Despite Pashinyan commits loyal to the policy of the Armenian authorities before him in order to acquire any leverage over the Karabakh issue, he currently has much less material and authority regarding Karabakh than his predecessors. However, Pashinyan's government is willing to exclude the diaspora and even Russia from the game in hopes of playing an active role in the peace process (leaning on Vardanyan's removal). Although the radical diaspora wing protested Pashinyan's policy regarding Karabakh, this actually stems from his attempts to normalize relations with his neighbors - Türkiye and Azerbaijan, rather than the loss of Karabakh.

The future development of Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye seems complicated. The point is that, although Pashinyan was severely criticized by diaspora organizations for his efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye and his defeatist position on the Karabakh issue, the most rational way for Armenia at the moment is to normalize relations with its neighbors. Because Russia, weakened by the war in Ukraine, although Russia continues to be a regional dominant power for Armenia, it is certain that it does not promise anything for the future of Armenia. Moreover, peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye is important for Armenia, which is trying to integrate into Europe. Only with this, Armenia can participate in regional projects and expand its relations with Europe. As for the diaspora, first of all, the diaspora should stop its anti-Turkish position. Over time, the gains from opening borders will reduce dissent. The diaspora will have to end the senseless anti-Turkish policy.

Another way is the more illogical role of solidarity with the diaspora. In fact, it is difficult to say exactly in which direction Pashinyan is moving today. The frequent collisions and problems in negotiations with Azerbaijan are probably caused by the influence of the diaspora on Pashinyan's rule. By neutralizing Türkiye as much as possible, On the other hand, Armenia seeks to reduce the impact of the Karabakh issue on Turkish-Armenian relations. However, it is clear that Türkiye will not go for it. But of course, this undermines the spirit of the negotiations. Listening to the diaspora and continuing the historical enmity has no benefit for the region and Armenia.

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